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OSHA’s Comprehensive Failure to
Protect Workers During the COVID-19
Pandemic
Nancy M. Modesitt*
ABSTRACT
Under the Trump Administration, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (“OSHA”), failed to protect workers
from COVID-19, which has led to deadly workplace outbreaks of
the virus. OSHA’s failures began when it refused to produce legally-binding rules, known as emergency temporary standards,
that would mandate the most basic step of requiring masks in the
workplace to protect workers from the risks of infection on the
job. In addition, while OSHA did produce non-binding guidance
for employers, that guidance was unclear and fundamentally deficient in failing to require masks in all workplaces and failing to
require recordkeeping that would identify potential outbreaks in
workplaces in their early stages. OSHA also refused to use its
enforcement authority in a way that would encourage employers
to use risk-mitigation strategies in the workplace. Rather than
increasing inspections to send a signal that employers need to
protect workers from COVID-19, OSHA conducted fewer inspections during the pandemic than it had in previous years. Essentially, OSHA has provided a playbook of what not to do in a
pandemic. This Article exposes the details of OSHA’s failed response to COVID-19, outlines actions that would be effective in
protecting workers during a pandemic, and recommends structural, legislative changes that would enable OSHA to better respond to pandemics in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
The novel coronavirus has exposed significant flaws in the system of protecting employee safety in the United States. The federal
agency tasked with protecting workers, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”), failed to protect workers from
the risks of infection with COVID-19. First, OSHA failed to produce legally-binding rules that would require employers to take
even the most basic steps to protect workers from the risks of infection on the job. Second, the non-binding guidance that OSHA pro-
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vided was fundamentally deficient because it failed to require
masks in workplaces, failed to require employers to take action to
induce infected employees to stay out of the workplace, and failed
to require recordkeeping that would identify potential outbreaks in
workplaces in their early stages. Third, OSHA failed to use its investigative authority in a way that would encourage employers to
use risk-mitigation strategies in the workplace. Instead, OSHA conveyed the message to employers that it would not take action to
protect workers and that employers need not be concerned with
penalties for failing to take basic steps to protect workers.
This Article begins by explaining the fundamentals of OSHA
and how OSHA and state agencies provide safety and health protection in the workplace. The Article then analyzes the myriad of
ways in which OSHA fundamentally and irresponsibly failed in its
most basic obligation to protect workers from the risks of COVID19. This Article explains what actions OSHA should have undertaken and then proposes amendments to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act1 that would allow OSHA to respond to any future
emergencies in the workplace more effectively.
I. WORKPLACE PROTECTION
AND STATE SYSTEMS

IN THE

UNITED STATES: OSHA

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“the OSH
Act”) was the first federal employment health and safety statute of
general applicability. Before the OSH Act, protection of employee
safety and health was primarily a creature of state law, with a few
exceptions for areas of specific federal interest.2 However, these
state safety and health protection systems for employees were generally seen as insufficient to adequately protect workers. In the
years before the OSH Act was passed, approximately 14,000 American workers died on the job each year, and another 2.5 million
suffered job-related disabilities.3 Workplace safety varied greatly
from state to state, with the job accident rate at 19 job accidents per
100,000 workers in some states and at 110 job accidents per 100,000
workers in other states.4
The OSH Act created a dual system of workplace safety and
health protection. While there would be a federal agency (the Oc1. Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (1970) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678).
2. See, e.g., The Federal Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–966.
3. Lloyd Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 327, 327
(1974).
4. Id. at 330.
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cupational Health and Safety Administration) to establish baseline
safety and health standards,5 the OSH Act’s goal was to create a
decentralized system,6 in which states would establish their own
OSHA-like agency7 and these state agencies would have greater
control than OSHA over safety and health.8 By 1976, approximately half the states had established their own agencies, with the
approval of OSHA, to oversee the safety and health of employees
within that state.9 Since then, there has not been substantial change.
However, while many states retain their own agencies to oversee
occupational safety and health, OSHA’s requirements provide a
floor for all states.
A. Overview of the OSH Act
The OSH Act, which has only been modified slightly since its
enactment, contains several components. First, it sets out an employer’s general obligation “to furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees.”10 This provision is known
as the general duty clause. Second, the OSH Act requires employers to comply with safety and health standards promulgated pursuant to the Act.11 Third, the OSH Act authorizes the Secretary of
Labor to conduct inspections and investigations of workplaces.12
The Secretary is also authorized to issue citations and fines for violations of the OSH Act.13 Fourth, employers are required to maintain records as required by the Secretary of Labor.14
The OSH Act also addresses employee rights and obligations.
Employees are required to comply with safety and health standards.15 Employees are entitled to file a complaint for violations of
safety or health standards16 and request an inspection of their work5. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (requiring that state safety and health standards
be “at least as effective” as the federal standards).
6. See id § 667 (establishing standards for states to assume authority).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., REFLECTIONS ON OSHA’S HISTORY 15 (2008).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
11. Id. § 654(a)(2).
12. Id. § 657(a).
13. Id. §§ 658–659.
14. Id. § 657(c). The statute required the Secretary of Labor to coordinate
with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in determining what recordkeeping would be required.
15. Id. § 654.
16. Id. § 657(f)(2).
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place for violations of safety or health standards that threaten physical harm or present an “imminent danger” in the workplace.17 A
prohibition on retaliation by the employer protects an employee’s
right to file a complaint.18 However, the only right an employee has
if employer retaliation occurs is to file a claim with the Secretary of
Labor.19
Shortly after the passage of the OSH Act, the Secretary of Labor delegated his authority under the OSH Act to the newly-created position of Assistant Secretary of Occupational Safety and
Health and the newly-created agency known as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.20 Pursuant to this delegation of
authority, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary, OSHA
has since been responsible for developing safety and health
standards.21
While interested parties may petition for OSHA to promulgate
safety and health standards,22 OSHA has wide latitude in determining whether to do so.23 However, Congress has at times required
OSHA to issue a standard. For example, in 1987, Congress demanded that OSHA issue standards for hazardous waste operations.24 Similarly, in 1991, Congress required OSHA to issue a final
standard for bloodborne pathogens.25
B. Overview of OSHA’s Safety & Health Standards
Pursuant to the OSH Act, OSHA may promulgate three types
of standards to protect worker safety: national consensus standards,
emergency temporary standards, and all other standards.26 All
three types of standards have different methods for promulgation.
National consensus standards were to be drawn from existing
agreements regarding safety standards. OSHA was required to de17. Id. § 657(f)(1).
18. Id. § 660(c)(1).
19. Id. § 660(c)(2).
20. Secretary of Labor’s Order 12-71, 36 Fed. Reg. 8754, May 12, 1971.
21. Id.
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.3 (2020).
23. See Int’l Union v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor has discretion to determine when to commence rulemaking
proceedings).
24. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, § 126(a)–(f), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
25. Pub. L. No. 102-170, § 100, 105 Stat. 1107 (1991).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 655.
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velop these as soon as “practicable” and could only produce them
within two years of the enactment of the statute.27
Emergency temporary standards are effective upon publication
in the Federal Register and require no notice and comment period.28 However, upon publication of an emergency temporary standard, OSHA must immediately begin the process of developing a
permanent standard to replace the emergency temporary standard.29 The permanent standard must be promulgated within six
months of the publication of the emergency temporary standard.30
The remaining standards developed by OSHA are governed by
traditional requirements of notice and comment rulemaking.31 The
statute identifies the Secretary of Labor as the person responsible
for commencing the development of a health or safety standard
under the OSH Act.32 The statute provides that the Secretary33 may
promulgate an occupational safety or health standard when he determines that a rule “should be promulgated in order to serve the
objectives of [the OSH Act].”34 While “any interested person” may
file a petition for OSHA to commence rulemaking proceedings,35
discretion is vested in the Secretary to determine when it is appropriate to initiate such proceedings, regardless of petitions for
action.36
All three types of occupational safety and health standards
have proven difficult to promulgate effectively. National consensus
standards were plagued by problems such as the fact that many of
the existing safety “standards” were not mandatory in their wording. When OSHA attempted to make national consensus standards
mandatory, the change in wording led courts to determine that the

27. “[T]he Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period beginning
with the effective date of this chapter and ending two years after such date, by rule
promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national consensus
standard.” Id. § 655(a).
28. Id. § 655(c).
29. Id. § 655(c)(3).
30. Id.
31. See id. § 655(b).
32. Id. § 652.
33. The Secretary of Labor has delegated that authority to the Assistant Secretary of OSHA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1911.3 (2020).
36. See Int’l Union v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor has discretion to determine when to commence rulemaking
proceedings).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK105.txt

unknown

2021] OSHA’S COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE

Seq: 7

TO

15-OCT-21

PROTECT WORKERS

14:20

199

revisions to the standards prevented them from being considered
national consensus standards.37
OSHA has also struggled to promulgate permanent safety and
health standards, resulting in a lack of protection for workers and
calls for reform.38 Two major hurdles for OSHA are the requirements that OSHA establish (1) that a safety or health hazard poses
a “significant risk” in the workplace;39 and (2) that the proposed
standard is “feasible.”40 An example of this struggle that garnered
significant scholarly attention was the failure of OSHA to take
prompt action to regulate diacetyl, a substance that caused irreversible damage to workers in microwave popcorn producing factories.41 OSHA failed to take action to regulate the substance,
resulting in numerous workplace deaths and serious injuries to
workers’ lungs. The diacetyl example illustrates one of the common
issues OSHA faces when creating new standards: regulated industries challenging the science underlying OSHA’s proposed standards. Regulated industries have effectively used uncertainty in the
precise details of risk exposure and resulting injury to prevent
OSHA from promulgating standards, as occurred in the diacetyl
context, as well as to successfully challenge OSHA standards once

37. See MARK ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH L. § 4:8
(2020) (discussing litigation problems with national consensus standards).
38. See Gwen Forté, Rethinking America’s Approach to Workplace Safety: A
Model for Advancing Safety Issues in the Chemical Industry, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
513, 529 (2006) (discussing OSHA’s failure to promulgate standards and noting
that as of 2006 “OSHA has issued only fifty permanent standards”); Jason R. Bent,
An Incentive-Based Approach to Regulating Workplace Chemicals, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1389, 1391 (2012) (noting that “the United States’ system for regulating employee exposures to hazardous chemicals in the workplace is broken” and calling
for an entirely new system); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How A
Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of
Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1399–400 (2011) (noting that
“delays by OSHA in setting standards for workplace hazards deny workers intended benefits of the OSH Act” and suggesting reforms to the administrative
system more broadly); Thomas O. McGarity, Reforming OSHA: Some Thoughts
for the Current Legislative Agenda, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 116 (1994).
39. See Indus Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., Inc., 448 U.S.
607, 643 (1980).
40. See generally Am. Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
41. See generally Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn Lung Case Study: A
Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87 (2009).
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promulgated.42 Updating old standards has also been a problem for
OSHA.43
OSHA has also struggled to promulgate emergency temporary
standards. The OSH Act requires that there be a “grave danger” to
workers and that an emergency temporary standard be “necessary”
to reduce the danger.44 Because it is so difficult to meet the requirements to promulgate an emergency temporary standard, OSHA has
failed to promulgate any since 1983.45 Prior to 1983, OSHA attempted to promulgate emergency temporary standards on a number of occasions, but many of the standards were challenged in
court and vacated or otherwise blocked from becoming effective.46
While courts have provided various reasons for blocking emergency
temporary standards,47 a common focus was on the language that
the standard be “necessary,” with courts determining that this requirement was not fulfilled.48
C. Overview of OSHA’s Enforcement System
As noted above, OSHA has the right to conduct inspections
and investigations of workplaces to ensure compliance with the
general duty clause as well as specific safety and health standards.
OSHA inspections can be either proactive in nature, when OSHA
has no specific concern at a workplace, or reactive, when OSHA
42. David Michaels, M.P.H., Ph.D. & Celeste Monforton, M.P.H., Scientific
Evidence in the Regulatory System: Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of
the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 17, 38 (2005) (noting that “the
strategy of creating uncertainty regarding the risks associated with pharmaceutical
use, chemical exposure, and the use of hazardous products, has been remarkably
successful”).
43. See, e.g., John Howard, Setting Occupational Exposure Limits: Are We
Living in A Post-Oel World?, 7 UNIV. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 513, 525 (2005) (discussing problems updating permissible exposure limits).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c).
45. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND
COVID-19 23 (2021).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 486 F.2d 98, 106 (3d
Cir. 1973) (finding that OSHA’s “conclusory statement of reasons [for the standard] places too great a burden on interested persons to determine and challenge
the basis for the standard” and vacating the emergency temporary standard in
part).
48. See, e.g., Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120, 129
(5th Cir. 1974) (“We find no substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole to support the determination by the Secretary that emergency temporary
standards were necessary . . . .”); Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N. Am. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Admin., 727 F.2d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The Agency has not
proved that the ETS, OSHA’s most dramatic weapon in its enforcement arsenal, is
‘necessary’ to achieve the projected benefits.”).
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responds to information suggesting possible violations. Proactive inspections, which OSHA calls “targeted inspections,” focus on highhazard industries.49 Employers in these industries can avoid the
normal inspection process if they participate in OSHA’s voluntary
participation program (“VPP”). The program requires that OSHA
certify workplaces as meeting certain safety and health criteria.50 If
a workplace has an injury and illness rate below the prevailing rate
in its industry, the workplace is eligible to be in VPP.51 The company must undergo evaluations by OSHA and maintain a comprehensive health and safety management system that includes
involvement of both management and front line employees, hazard
control analysis, and safety and health training.52 For those workplaces outside of VPP, OSHA focuses on high-hazard industries.53
Programmed inspections will occur more often in these industries,
frequently pursuant to a national or regional emphasis program.54
Size of the workplace is also a factor, as workplaces with ten or
fewer employees are typically excluded from programmed
inspections.55
Reactive inspections occur in response to imminent danger, a
worker’s complaint, a referral from another agency or entity, or a
workplace fatality or severe injury.56 In 2018, there were 5,250
workplace fatalities in the United States.57 Under OSHA’s current
Field Operations Manual, unprogrammed inspections are a higher
49. OSHA, Fact Sheet, Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) Inspections,
DEP’T OF LAB. (2016), https://bit.ly/3jRvwiA [https://perma.cc/593L-88GC].
50. OSHA has undertaken other experimental programs. See Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 373, 389 (2000)
(outlining various initiatives).
51. OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PROGRAMS POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 17 (2020).
52. Id.
53. OSHA’s website sets out basic information about enforcement priorities.
See generally OSHA, Enforcement, DEPT. OF LAB., https://bit.ly/3htzdv0 [https://
perma.cc/M43Z-M4TY] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). It also contains detailed information about national and regional emphasis programs. Id. For a description of
inspection priorities in general, see OSHA, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. 2
(discussing types of inspections, including programmed inspections); OSHA,
SCHEDULING SYSTEM FOR PROGRAMMED INSPECTIONS § B.1 (1995) (discussing
creation of inspection list for programmed inspections).
54. See, e.g., OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., NATIONAL EMPHASIS PROGRAM ON AMPUTATIONS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 3 (2019) (describing the process for
selecting workplace inspection sites under the program).
55. See OSHA, Dep’t of Lab., Scheduling System for Programmed Inspections § B.1.b.(1)(b) (1995).
56. Id.
57. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 2018 CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES (2018).
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priority than programmed inspections.58 Specifically, inspections of
workplaces involving imminent danger are the highest priority, followed by inspections of workplace fatalities and catastrophes.59
Complaints about workplaces are the third priority for inspections,
and regular programmed inspections are last on the list of
priorities.60
OSHA’s Field Operations Manual requires the investigation of
all work-related fatalities and catastrophes.61 A fatality is an “employee death resulting from a work-related incident or exposure; in
general, from an injury or an illness caused by or related to a workplace hazard.”62 A catastrophe is “the hospitalization of three or
more employees resulting from a work-related incident or
exposure.”63
OSHA’s lack of effective enforcement systems in regulating
workplace safety and health have long been recognized.64 Problems
arise when OSHA takes more of a command-and-control enforcement approach65 as well as when OSHA has undertaken new governance models involving softer regulation.66 Some of the calls to
reform OSHA have focused on more effective enforcement.67
OSHA inspections are a critical component of workplace
safety and health. OSHA’s inspections have been shown to reduce
workplace injuries in the years following them, with proactive inspections having the largest impact.68 Furthermore, inspections do
58. OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, ch. 2, tbl.2-1
(2020).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at ch. 11, § II.C.1.
62. Id. § II.A.1.
63. Id. § II.A.2.
64. See John Howard, OSHA Standards-Setting: Past Glory, Present Reality
and Future Hope, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 237, 263 (2010) (“Comprehensive
reform of the Act has been a topic on the public policy agenda in the occupational
safety and health community and in the Congress for twenty years.”).
65. See Gwen Forté, Rethinking America’s Approach to Workplace Safety: A
Model for Advancing Safety Issues in the Chemical Industry, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
513, 530 (2006) (noting that “a lack of resources also prevents OSHA from ensuring that businesses under its authority comply”)
66. See generally, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Learn in Troubled Times:
Deregulation and Safe Work in the New Economy, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1197 (2009)
(discussing problems with softer regulatory enforcement systems of new governance approaches under the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations).
67. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 64 at 263–65 (calling for statutory changes
such as increasing fines and allowing private rights of action).
68. Amelia M. Haviland et al., A New Estimate of the Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injury Rates, 1998–2005, 55 AM. J. IND. MED. 964, 972
(2012).
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not result in any job declines; in fact, they result in financial benefits
in the form of reduced injury costs to employers.69
Despite this evidence of the power of inspections, OSHA has
struggled throughout its existence with obtaining the resources to
conduct regular, or even occasional, inspections of workplaces. In
1992, it would have taken OSHA 84 years to inspect every workplace within its jurisdiction.70 By 2013, the problem had grown
worse, with an American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”) report finding that it would
have taken 131 years to inspect each workplace.71
Over the years since its inception, the number of workplaces
subject to inspection has grown while OSHA’s resources have remained generally flat.72 The problem has grown worse under the
Trump administration. The average number of inspections in the
first three years of the Trump administration was the lowest out of
any three-year period since 2000.73 As of the end of 2019, OSHA
had the fewest number of inspectors in 40 years.74
II.

OSHA FAILED
COVID-19

TO

ADEQUATELY PROTECT WORKERS

FROM

Against this backdrop of long-term problems with OSHA’s
standards-setting and enforcement processes, it is not surprising
that OSHA’s response to COVID-19 has failed to adequately protect workers from infection in their workplaces. OSHA failed to
enact an emergency temporary standard that would have set
mandatory standards for employee safety. Instead, OSHA relied on
developing nonmandatory guidance for employers, which was entirely inadequate in substance to protect workers. And when employers failed to act to protect employees, and those employees
complained, OSHA then compounded its errors by failing to
69. David I. Levine et al., Randomized Government Safety Inspections Reduce
Worker Injuries with No Detectable Job Loss, 336 SCIENCE 907, 907 (2012);
Michael Foley et al., The Impact of Regulatory Enforcement and Consultation Visits on Workers’ Compensation Claims Incidence Rates and Costs, 1999–2008, 55
AM. J. IND. MED. 976, 987 (2012) (discussing the effect of state safety and health
inspections).
70. Roy Mauer, Report Finds OSHA Resources Lacking, Penalties Weak,
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (May 13, 2013), https://bit.ly/2T7IHCS [https://
perma.cc/AG49-6HTU] (discussing AFL-CIO report from 1992).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See generally Deborah Berkowitz, Workplace Safety & Health Enforcement Falls to Lowest Levels in Decades, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://bit.ly/3yZYNOj [https://perma.cc/2HDF-A4MC] (discussing trends).
74. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK105.txt

204

unknown

Seq: 12

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

15-OCT-21

14:20

[Vol. 126:193

quickly and adequately investigate those complaints and undertake
a system of programmed inspections.
A. OSHA Failed to Create an Emergency Temporary Standard,
Relying Instead on Nonmandatory Guidance Documents
The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) identified the first
case of COVID-19 in the United States as occurring on January 20,
2020.75 While the early cases were travel-related, with importations
of the virus from China and Europe, some community transmission
was occurring as early as late January and early February in the
United States.76 On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared a
national emergency due to the novel coronavirus.77
Given the national emergency declaration, it would logically
follow that the situation was sufficiently dire for OSHA to at least
consider drafting an emergency temporary standard. The AFL-CIO
petitioned for an emergency temporary standard on March 6,
2020,78 and several Senators and Members of Congress urged Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia to promulgate one.79 The Director,
the National Institute for Safety and Health (“NIOSH”), admitted
in testimony before a congressional committee that SARS-COV-2
constituted a “grave danger” to American workers.80 Despite legislative support, OSHA denied the AFL-CIO’s petition, reasoning
that an emergency temporary standard “was not necessary” because OSHA’s guidance to employers and enforcement of existing
standards “renders an [emergency temporary standard] unnecessary.”81 OSHA also noted that the evolving nature of the situation
75. Jennifer Harcourt et al., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
2 from Patient with Coronavirus Disease, United States, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASE J. 1266, 1266 (2020).
76. See Michelle A. Jorden, MD et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of
COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REPS. 680, 680 (2020).
77. Proclamation No. 9994, 50 Fed. Reg. 15, 337 (Mar. 18, 2020).
78. Richard L. Trumka, A Petition to Secretary Scalia for an OSHA Emergency Temporary Standard for Infectious Disease, AFL-CIO (Mar. 6, 2020), https://
bit.ly/2VARUEJ [https://perma.cc/9XZY-SRJW].
79. Justine Coleman, Democratic Senators Call on OSHA to Issue Emergency
Temporary Standard for Workers Due to Coronavirus Outbreak, THE HILL (Mar.
10, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://bit.ly/2UDoHbI [https://perma.cc/82FQ-AEQD]; Press
Release, Educ. & Lab. Comm., Chairman Scott, Rep. Adams Call on Secretary
Scalia to Take Immediate Action to Protect Workers Against COVID-19 (Mar. 6,
2020), https://bit.ly/3yHyCvJ [https://perma.cc/2BZS-L669].
80. See Scott Schneider, The Battle for an Emergency Temporary Standard to
Address COVID-19, LABORERS’ HEALTH & SAFETY FUND OF N. AM. (July 2020),
https://bit.ly/3iD0ony [https://perma.cc/NBZ7-NCNV].
81. Letter from Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of
Lab., to Richard L. Trumka, President, AFL-CIO, (May 29, 2020).
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called for using guidance documents, which could be easily
revised.82
The AFL-CIO petitioned for a writ of mandamus to force
OSHA to promulgate an emergency temporary standard, but a
panel of judges on the D.C. Circuit denied the petition, noting that
“OSHA’s decision not to issue an [emergency temporary standard]
is entitled to considerable deference.”83
OSHA’s decision not to create an enforceable standard put
employees at risk because the guidance documents issued were inadequate, as discussed below in Section II.B., and because of the
lack of enforcement under the general duty clause, as discussed below in detail in Section II.C.
B. OSHA’s Guidance Was Inadequate to Abate the Risks of
Infection
Instead of issuing an emergency temporary standard, OSHA’s
first response to the pandemic occurred on March 9, 2020, when it
issued “Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for COVID-19”84 (“the
March 2020 Guidance”). The very first page of the March 2020 Guidance indicates its nonmandatory nature by stating that “This guidance is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal
obligations. It contains recommendations.”85 The March 2020 Guidance clearly states its voluntary nature by articulating what employers should do with a section called “Steps All Employers Can
Take to Reduce Workers’ Risk of Exposure to SARS-CoV-2.”86
Nowhere in the March 2020 Guidance is there any articulation of
what employers must do to protect workers, except in general
terms. At the beginning of the March 2020 Guidance, after the disclaimer indicating that the guidance is not a mandatory standard, it
states that:
Pursuant to the OSH Act, employers must comply with safety
and health standards and regulations issued and enforced either
by OSHA or by an OSHA-approved State Plan. In addition, the
OSH Act’s General Duty Clause, Section 5(a)(1), requires em82. Id.
83. In re Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., No. 20-1158, 2020 WL
3125324, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020).
84. U.S. Department of Labor Offers Guidance For Preparing Workplaces for
Coronavirus, OSHA (Mar. 9, 2020), https://bit.ly/3k0Z8Mj [https://perma.cc/
6MUE-2JYN].
85. See generally OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19 (2020), https://bit.ly/3huOL1q [https://perma.cc/TY4X9HHA].
86. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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ployers to provide their employees with a workplace free from
recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.87

The March 2020 Guidance produced in response to the
coronavirus borrows heavily from a 2009 guidance document that
OSHA promulgated during the Obama administration called “Guidance for Preparing Workplaces for an Influenza Pandemic”88 (“the
2009 Guidance”). OSHA could have used this 2009 Guidance as the
basis for crafting an emergency temporary standard that was specifically focused on the risks of the coronavirus instead of influenza.
Indeed, given that the risk of death from COVID-19 was higher
than the risk of death from influenza, it would be appropriate to
take more precautions and require more from employers to ensure
worker safety. Instead of taking this approach, OSHA watered
down the 2009 Guidance to make fewer recommendations that
would impose costs and burdens on employers.
1. The Risk Pyramid and Improper Categorization of Most
Workers as Being at Low or Medium Risk of Infection
One way OSHA diluted the 2009 Guidance was by changing
the identification of groups of employees considered at medium
risk of exposure. The 2009 Guidance developed a risk pyramid that
categorized workplaces according to the risks of exposure to influenza in a pandemic.89 This risk pyramid was copied into the March
2020 Guidance, with changes suggesting that most workers would
be in the lowest risk group. The 2009 Guidance stated that “[t]he
vast majority of American workplaces are likely to be in the medium exposure risk or lower exposure risk (caution) groups.”90 The
March 2020 Guidance flipped this wording to state that “[m]ost
American workers will likely fall in the lower exposure risk (caution) or medium exposure risk levels.”91
Following up on this, OSHA altered the definition of the medium risk group in the March 2020 Guidance to make it less inclusive. In the 2009 Guidance, the medium risk group was defined as:
“Employees with high-frequency contact with the general population (such as schools, high-population-density work environments,
87. Id. at 4.
88. See generally OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC (2009), https://bit.ly/3k2xb6B [https://
perma.cc/JA5W-MYXN].
89. Id. at 11.
90. Id. at 12.
91. OSHA, supra note 85, at 18.
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and some high volume retail).”92 The 2009 Guidance clarified this
definition, which was somewhat unclear as to whether high-population-density work environments were always medium risk or only
when there is contact between the employees and the general population, by stating later in the Guidance that “[m]edium risk workplaces require frequent close contact between employees or with
the general public.”93
The March 2020 Guidance made the medium risk category of
workers smaller by failing to clarify whether medium risk workplaces would include workers in high-population-density workplaces. The statement from the 2009 Guidance that medium risk
workplaces include settings where there is “close contact between
employees” is not present in the March 2020 Guidance. OSHA also
limited the employees in medium risk workplaces by focusing the
definition of medium risk on whether there was community transmission of COVID-19.94 If there was no community transmission of
COVID-19, then the medium risk group was limited to workers
who “may have frequent contact with travelers who may return
from international locations with widespread COVID-19 transmission.”95 Thus, until there was community transmission, employers
would categorize workplaces that have contact with the general
population, which would have been medium risk under the 2009
Guidance, as being lower risk.96 The March 2020 Guidance then
divided the workplace risk based on whether there is community
transmission of the virus.97 If there was community transmission,
then the medium risk group included workers who “may have contact with the general public (e.g., schools, high-population-density
work environments, some high-volume retail settings).”98 There
were three problems with this definition: (1) it assumed that employers are aware of community spread; (2) it contained unrealistic
expectations that there would be areas in the United States where
community transmission would not occur; and (3) it was confusing
as to whether those in high-population-density workplaces that do
not have contact with the general public were included in the risk
category. These problems were all avoided in the 2009 Guidance,
which ignored the component of community transmission in favor
of a clearer definition.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

OSHA, supra note 88, at 11.
Id. at 29.
OSHA, supra note 85, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A careful reading of the final category of workers, those with
lower exposure risk, could indicate that workers in close quarters
should be considered medium risk. The explanation of who is at a
lower exposure risk provides that “[w]orkers in this category have
minimal occupational contact with the public and other coworkers.”99 Thus, one could infer that workers with more than minimal
contact with other coworkers are not lower risk, and presumably
would be medium risk. However, the phrase “minimal occupational
contact” with coworkers could easily be read to place most workers
into the lower exposure risk category, since most employees do not
have physical “contact,” with their coworkers. In sum, OSHA’s guidance indicates that workers in the meatpacking industry would be
either medium or lower risk, depending on whether there was community transmission of COVID-19.
In addition to categorizing workplaces in a manner that moved
many workers from medium risk to lower risk, the March 2020 Guidance also eliminated suggestions to increase workplace safety for
medium risk workers. The 2009 Guidance tells employers to
“[i]nstruct employees to avoid close contact (within 6 feet) with
other employees,”100 and states that “employees should avoid close
contact with their coworkers.”101 More generally, the 2009 Guidance tells employers “[t]he best strategy to reduce the risk of becoming infected with influenza during a pandemic is to avoid
crowded settings.”102 In contrast, the March 2020 Guidance fails to
mention keeping employees at any distance from each other, and
fails to mention crowded settings at all. The focus, instead, is on
avoiding individuals who are sick.103
OSHA has gone on to produce additional nonmandatory guidance for employers on protecting workers from COVID-19. These
guidance documents include general guidance on returning to work
after the lockdowns imposed in many states,104 industry-specific
guidance,105 and enforcement guidance.106 While it is impossible to
discuss all the guidance documents that OSHA produced, the Gui99. Id.
100. OSHA, supra note 88, at 29.
101. Id. at 27.
102. Id. at 26.
103. See, e.g., OSHA, supra note 85, at 9 (recommending that employers develop policies for identifying and isolating sick workers).
104. OSHA, DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON RETURNING TO WORK (2020),
https://bit.ly/3wzqGLj [https://perma.cc/9D3Z-HWX3].
105. OSHA, News and Updates, DEP’T OF LAB., https://bit.ly/3fXJmim [https:/
/perma.cc/V9E9-6P3U] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (containing OSHA guidance
documents for specific industries).
106. Id. (containing OSHA enforcement guidance and memoranda).
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dance on Returning to Work stands out because of its general applicability. In this guidance document, OSHA fails to correct the
problems with the risk pyramid.107 It does, however, recommend
social distancing at work.108
2. OSHA’s Guidance Failed to Require Face Masks in
Workplaces
Another way in which OSHA’s guidance documents failed to
protect workers is the lack of focus on ensuring masks are used in
the workplace. OSHA’s March 2020 Guidance failed to protect any
worker in a congregate setting with this lack of emphasis on masks.
As a general statement, OSHA tells employers to: “Take steps to
limit [the] spread of the respiratory secretions of a person who may
have COVID-19. Provide a face mask, if feasible and available, and
ask the person to wear it, if tolerated.”109 As noted above, the nonmandatory nature of the March 2020 Guidance makes all of its
statements mere exhortations. This problem is exacerbated by limiting language. Terms like “if feasible and available” and “if tolerated” undercut the overall impact of the instructions to use a mask.
Exacerbating this problem is the March 2020 Guidance’s lack
of clear instructions as to whether masks were required for most
workers. As discussed above, the March 2020 Guidance categorized
workers by their risk of exposure and recommended greater protections for workers at the higher end of the exposure pyramid. The
March 2020 Guidance completely failed to recognize the risks of
exposure in workplaces such as meatpacking plants, where workers
are very close together for hours at a time. Only first responders,
health care, laboratory, and morgue workers were identified as high
risk workers.110 Employers of these workers were instructed to provide personal protective equipment (“PPE”). Medium risk workplaces were defined as: “those that require frequent and/or close
contact with (i.e., within 6 feet of) people who may be infected with
SARS-CoV-2, but who are not known or suspected COVID-19
patients.”111
For medium risk workers, OSHA’s guidance to employers regarding face masks was, “Workers with medium exposure risk may
need to wear some combination of gloves, a gown, a face mask,
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

OSHA, supra note 104.
Id. at 7.
OSHA, supra note 85, at 10.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
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and/or a face shield or goggles.”112 Whether these workers need to
wear any of this PPE was to be determined based on “the results of
the employer’s hazard assessment.”113 And if companies determined that their workers were in the lower risk category, which
could include most workplaces, including congregate settings like
meatpacking factories, due to OSHA’s poor drafting of the risk categories, then they need not take any steps to protect workers from
COVID-19.114
Essentially, OSHA’s nonmandatory guidance told most companies that they could determine the risk level of their workers and
then allowed them to either provide no protective gear, including
face masks, or provide protective gear only if their own self-assessment indicated that it was necessary. In short, OSHA gave most
companies a green light to do nothing to protect their workers.
Unsurprisingly, then, companies failed to provide face masks
to their employees in the weeks after OSHA’s guidance was issued.
The meatpacking industry is a clear example of the consequences of
failing to require masks. A Washington Post investigation revealed
that workers were not provided with face masks at a Tyson’s
meatpacking plant in Iowa. As a result, some workers wore items
such as eye masks while others wore no face coverings at all.115 Indeed, the largest meatpacking company in the world, JBS, admitted
that it did not receive masks for its workers until April 2 and did
not require them to be worn until April 13.116 Tyson Foods admitted that it did not require masks until April 15. And Smithfield
workers reported that they did not receive masks until sometime in
early April.117 In essence, three of the largest companies in the
meatpacking industry failed to make mask-wearing, the most basic
of the steps needed to reduce transmission, mandatory until approximately a month after the OSHA guidance was released. Furthermore, these steps appear to have been taken not in response to
OSHA, but in response to the threat of state and local officials
shutting down plants.118
112. Id. at 22.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 20–21.
115. Taylor Telford & Kimberly Kindy, As They Rushed to Maintain U.S.
Meat Supply, Big Processors Saw Plants Become Covid-19 Hot Spots, Worker Illnesses Spike, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2020), https://wapo.st/3qZxC3j [https://
perma.cc/7DRB-TR9B].
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.; see also Michael Grabell et al., Emails Reveal Chaos as
Meatpacking Companies Fought Health Agencies Over COVID-19 Outbreaks in
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The lack of effective guidance on masks extended beyond
meatpacking companies. While it is possible to argue that OSHA
initially did not come out with a strong mask mandate because of a
nationwide shortage, that shortage ended fairly quickly, except for
surgical and N-95 masks. On June 18, 2020, OSHA had the opportunity to strongly encourage employers to mandate masks in all
workplaces where employees would interact with others when it
promulgated its guidance on returning to work after the numerous
state-level shutdowns.119 Unfortunately, OSHA failed to do so.
With respect to face masks, OSHA stated, “Employers may consider requiring cloth face coverings to be worn in the workplace.”120
Even in OSHA’s COVID-19 FAQ section on its website, the
agency’s stance on masks is not clear. It states that “OSHA generally recommends that employers encourage workers to wear face
coverings at work.”121 The terms “recommends” and “encourage”
make it clear that this is not an OSHA mandate, and that employers are not responsible for requiring masks or providing them.
In sum, the general guidance documents for employers failed
to mandate face masks in the workplace. And while there was a
lack of consensus on the value of face coverings very early on in the
pandemic, by April 3, 2020, the CDC had recommended the use of
masks.122 One of the reasons for the recommendation is because
the CDC recognized that asymptomatic individuals could spread

Their Plants, PROPUBLIC (June 12, 2020), https://bit.ly/3qZrOqg [https://perma.cc/
Q9ZQ-FH2X].
119. OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor Issues OSHA Guidance As Non-Essential Businesses Reopen and Employees Return to Work, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.
(June 18, 2020), https://bit.ly/2UB7Cir [https://perma.cc/Z4FN-ZU8A].
120. OSHA, supra note 104, at 15. There is a location in the Guidance where
OSHA makes a stronger recommendation, stating that employers should “ensur[e]
workers wear appropriate face coverings, such as cloth face masks.” Id. at 8. However, this statement is buried in a section focusing on engineering, administrative
controls, and personal protective equipment, making it unclear whether all employers should do this or whether it is limited to situations where the employer’s
risk assessment calls for using personal protective gear or administrative controls.
Since the guidance does not discuss selection of these types of controls, employers
would need to follow the instructions for selecting appropriate controls from the
March 2020 Guidance. As discussed above, that document does not require anything of employers for lower risk workplaces. And for medium risk workplaces, it
requires only an evaluation, not PPE, and contains no mandate for a face mask.
121. OSHA, COVID-19 Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T OF LAB., https://
bit.ly/3yzURnB [https://perma.cc/E3VR-T9EZ] (last visited Aug. 11, 2021).
122. See Colin Dwyer & Allison Aubrey, CDC Now Recommends Americans
Consider Wearing Cloth Face Coverings In Public, NPR (Apr. 3, 2020), https://n.pr/
2TWiTde [https://perma.cc/7DPH-T2XZ].
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the infection.123 By summer 2020, it was clear that face masks were
a significant tool in preventing infection.124 Despite this consensus
and the data indicating that requiring face masks would cut down
on infection rates125 and potentially make infections that did occur
less serious,126 OSHA failed to mandate mask use in the workplace.
3. OSHA’s Guidance Allowed Employers to Keep Sick Workers
on the Job
In addition to the lack of effective guidance on face masks,
OSHA’s guidance failed to protect workers because its nonmandatory nature allowed companies to ignore its recommendations
about removing sick workers from the workplace and preventing
sick workers from being allowed to work. In its overview of what
employers are encouraged to do, the March 2020 Guidance stated
that “[a]s appropriate, all employers should implement good hygiene and infection control practices, including . . . [e]ncourage [sic]
workers to stay home if they are sick.”127 The March 2020 Guidance
also contained a section with more details on how employers should
handle potentially infected workers. This section suggested that employers “actively encourage sick employees to stay home.” As with
OSHA’s recommendations for face masks, the language used was
nonmandatory and fettered with limitations, such as the term “as
appropriate,” which provided employers with discretion to determine what is appropriate.
Furthermore, the recommendation was limited to currently
“sick” workers, which undermined its applicability and efficacy in
combatting COVID-19 infections. Individuals can spread the disease even when they are not displaying symptoms. Thus, those
workers who were not “sick” but who were infected could remain
in the workplace under the March 2020 Guidance.
Despite the problems described above with the OSHA recommendations, the March 2020 Guidance was much more clear about
what employers should do about sick employees—not allow them
123. Laura Geggel, Everyone Should Wear Face ‘Masks’ In Public, CDC Now
Recommends, LIVE SCI. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/3qZE8XP [https://perma.cc/
FNT4-EGE7].
124. See Nina Bai, Still Confused About Masks? Here’s the Science Behind
How Face Masks Prevent Coronavirus, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F. (June 26, 2020), https://
bit.ly/3k1gyIJ [https://perma.cc/X47D-LNJU].
125. Id.
126. Rong-Gong Lin II, Wearing Masks Could Help You Avoid Major Illness
Even if You Get Coronavirus, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://
lat.ms/3AJygX7 [https://perma.cc/VDJ3-7CRV].
127. OSHA, supra note 88, at 8.
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in the workplace—than with its recommendations about face
masks. However, employers failed to follow this basic suggestion
about keeping sick workers out of the workplace. For example, at a
JBS meat processing plant in Colorado, employees were encouraged to remain on the job even though they appeared to be
sick.128 One worker explained that when he asked to go home because he felt ill, his manager refused and required him to remain on
shift for the rest of the day. When he went to urgent care that night,
he had a fever of 104 and was hospitalized.129 Health officials in the
county where the plant was located complained about JBS’s “work
while sick” culture and found that 64% of workers who tested positive for COVID-19 at the plant had worked while symptomatic.
Workers at Smithfield and Tyson also reported similar experiences
of being encouraged to or told to work when they were sick.130
Smithfield workers were offered a $500 bonus to remain on the job
through all of April, and even after the outbreaks began, were subject to a point system of attendance which resulted in discharge for
missing 9 days of work per year.131
As these examples show, OSHA’s nonmandatory guidance was
clearly ineffective at getting employers to ensure that sick workers
would stay at home. Perhaps OSHA enforcement actions—inspections in response to employee complaints, for example—could have
motivated employers to take action. However, as discussed in Section II.C., OSHA utterly failed to take effective enforcement
action.
4. OSHA Guidance Failed to Require Reporting COVID-19
Infections, Which Allowed Outbreaks to Occur
Existing regulations, which predate COVID-19, require that
some employers keep records of workplace-related illnesses.132
However, there are numerous exemptions to these requirements.
Employers with fewer than ten employees need not keep such
records.133 Companies in more than 80 different industries are also
exempt from recordkeeping requirements, including dental offices,
outpatient health care offices, legal service offices, pipeline opera128. Telford & Kindy, supra note 115.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. A Smithfield worker, I Work At Smithfield Foods. I’m Suing Them over
Putting Our Lives at Risk for Your Dinner, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2020), https://
wapo.st/3hwdAKm [https://perma.cc/24BE-PLRN].
132. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1904 (2020). Section 1904.4(a)(1) sets forth the
limitation that only “work-related” illnesses are reportable.
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.1 (2020).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK105.txt

214

unknown

Seq: 22

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

15-OCT-21

14:20

[Vol. 126:193

tions, retail stores, telecommunications, and internet service providers.134 Even if they are generally exempt from most recordkeeping
requirements, companies still must report to OSHA any “workplace incident that results in an employee’s fatality, in-patient hospitalization, amputation, or loss of an eye.”135 Regardless of
whether employers need to keep detailed records or only report on
fatalities and other very serious incidents, the only injuries and illnesses that require reporting are ones that are “work-related.”136
Employers are instructed to “consider an injury or illness to be
work-related if an event or exposure in the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition.”137 Under
these regulations, if an employee is exposed to COVID-19 in the
workplace, and either dies or is admitted to the hospital, the employer must notify OSHA. However, these existing regulations fail
to require the reporting of most incidents of COVID-19 in the
workplace, because only a small percentage of cases result in hospitalization138 or death.139
These general reporting requirements for work-related illnesses are inadequate to protect employees from COVID-19. The
nature of COVID-19, specifically, the ease with which it is transmitted from one individual to another, means that anytime one employee is within a few feet of a sick employee, there is the potential
for transmission. Thus, to protect workers, employers should have
been required to collect information about COVID-19 infections
among its workers.
Unfortunately, the March 2020 Guidance says little about the
need for companies to provide information to OSHA or anyone
else about infections in the workplace. Only a few provisions address this need. The first mention of data gathering on infections is
not found until page 12 of the March 2020 Guidance, where it states
that employers should “[w]ork with insurance companies (e.g.,
those providing employee health benefits) and state and local
134. Id. § 1904.2 (2020); Nonmandatory app. A to Subpart B (2020) (listing
industries by classification code).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.2(a)(1) (2020).
136. Id. § 1904.4(a)(1).
137. Id. § 1904.5(a).
138. Brian Resnick, 12 Things Everyone Needs to Know About the
Coronavirus Pandemic, VOX (May 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/36qmOBR [https://
perma.cc/VM2D-CUL2] (noting a hospitalization rate of 12% in the United States
as of Mar. 2020).
139. Smriti Mallapaty, How Deadly Is the Coronavirus? Scientists Are Close to
an Answer, NATURE (June 16, 2020), https://go.nature.com/2UCnMZ5 [https/
perma.cc/WB7M-B9TP] (noting that approximately .5–1% of people infected die
from COVID-19).
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health agencies to provide information to workers and customers
about medical care in the event of a COVID-19 outbreak.”140 The
only other mention of data collection or reporting on illnesses in
the workplace is buried in a paragraph about information available
on OSHA’s COVID-19 webpage, where it states that more information is available, including information on “recordkeeping requirements and injury/illness recording criteria.”141 This statement
appears to be referencing the general-illness reporting criteria discussed above, which is insufficient to prevent outbreaks in
workplaces.
One would think that OSHA would have recognized the need
to prevent outbreaks in the workplace as the pandemic continued
by requiring employers to identify COVID-19 infections. However,
OSHA took the opposite approach by substantially limiting recordkeeping related to COVID-19 when it first directly addressed recordkeeping in the pandemic. On April 10, 2020, OSHA issued its
first guidance on reporting COVID-19 infections in the workplace.142 In this document, OSHA compounded the issues created
by the lack of specificity in the March 2020 Guidance by nearly
eliminating the reporting requirements for occupational illnesses.
Specifically, unless the workplace involved health care, first responders, or correctional facilities, employers were told that they
need not make the determination as to whether an infection in a
worker was “work-related.”143 As discussed above, it is only when
an illness is work-related that there is any obligation to report it.
Thus, by telling employers that they need not make this determination, OSHA was effectively instructing employers that COVID-19
infections were not work-related, and thus not reportable to
OSHA. OSHA did note that when an employer had objective evidence of work-related transmission that was reasonably available,
such as when there were “a number of cases developing among
workers who work closely together,” the employer should make the
determination of work-relatedness.144 Under this approach, employers could essentially put their heads in the sand and wait until
there were so many infections that it would be impossible to ignore
transmission at work. The rationale for the enforcement guidance
was that reducing the “difficult” determinations of work-related140. OSHA, supra note 85, at 12.
141. Id. at 18.
142. OSHA, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE FOR RECORDING CASES OF
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) (2020), https://bit.ly/3xzmpsv [https://
perma.cc/Q873-WZP7].
143. Id.
144. Id.
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ness would “help employers focus their response efforts on good
hygiene practices in their workplaces.”145 The message provided by
this enforcement guidance is clear: tracking transmission in the
workplace is less important than handwashing in the workplace.
This initial recordkeeping guidance was rescinded the following month. On May 26, 2020, OSHA promulgated new recordkeeping guidance.146 The May recordkeeping guidance eliminated the
presumption that COVID-19 was not a recordable illness unless it
occurred in a workplace involving health care, first responders, or a
correctional facility. Instead, OSHA essentially defaulted to the
general recordkeeping standards required by 29 C.F.R. Part
1904,147 with a specific requirement for testing that acted to limit
the employer’s need to record an illness as COVID-19 and workrelated. An employee’s illness was not to be considered COVID-19
unless there was a confirmed positive test for the disease.148 This is
a significant limitation, as testing in the United States was not readily available to all individuals.149
Having a positive test was only the first criteria for a COVID19 infection to be considered a recordable illness. In addition, the
infection had to be work-related. In this new guidance, OSHA’s
framing for making this determination appeared to push the inquiry
in the direction against the illness being work-related. For instance,
OSHA instructed that COVID-19 illnesses “are likely work-related
when several cases develop among workers who work closely together and there is no alternative explanation.”150 For workers who
interact outside the workplace, this would be difficult to establish.
Indeed, this limiting language “and there is no alternative explanation” is appended to each one of the scenarios in the recordkeeping
guidance where OSHA indicates that the illness is likely work-related.151 Note that the language OSHA used, “likely work-related”
did not even establish a presumption in favor of the illness being
work-related. Tacking on the limitation of eliminating alternative
145. Id.
146. Lee Anne Jillings & Patrick J. Kapust, Revised Enforcement Guidance
for Recording Cases of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB.: OSHA (2020), https://bit.ly/3AP84Kt [https://perma.cc/7SJV-Q6M5]. While
the document was published May 19, its effective date was not until May 26.
147. See id. (requiring recordkeeping if the employer meets the requirements
of existing regulation).
148. Id.
149. Eric C. Schneider, Failing the Test—The Tragic Data Gap Undermining
the U.S. Pandemic Response, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299, 300 (2020) (discussing
the shortages of testing in the United States).
150. OSHA, supra note 146 (emphasis added).
151. See id.
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explanations stacks the inquiry against work-relatedness. In essence, as long as the employer could come up with an alternative
explanation, the employer need not record the infection as being
work-related. The “alternative explanation” requirement applies
even in workplaces where employees are in close proximity to one
another.
In neither of these recordkeeping guidance documents is there
any mention of coordinating with local or state health departments.
Nor do the documents reference the CDC’s guidance documents152
for employers on managing COVID-19 in the workplace. In short,
OSHA’s guidance minimized the number of recordable COVID-19
infections and failed to suggest that employers had any role to play
in working with health department officials to identify, track, and
thereby limit outbreaks in workplaces in the United States.
Unsurprisingly, then, employers failed to provide information
to health departments that could have helped stem the wave of infections. For instance, in North Carolina, Tyson brought in a contractor to run testing and then refused to provide the results of
testing to local and state health officials until the contractor was
threatened with litigation.153 At one Tyson’s plant in Iowa, information on infections at the plant were not reported to health departments until May, when the governor ordered their disclosure. At
that point, 58 percent of the workers at the plant had tested
positive.154
The attitude of some company officials is illustrated by a statement from the chief executive of Smithfield Foods, Kenneth Sullivan, who told the governor of Nebraska that “Social distancing is a
nicety that makes sense only for people with laptops.”155 This statement was made in an email expressing “grave concerns” over the
stay-at-home orders, and it appeared that Mr. Sullivan’s primary
concern was that workers might not show up for work.156 In fact,
Smithfield offered workers a $500 “responsibility bonus” if they
152. The CDC maintained on its website detailed information for employers
on limiting the spread of COVID-19 in the workplace. Unfortunately, the CDC
guidance documents are all framed as voluntary on the part of the employer. See
Workplaces & Businesses, CDC (June 22, 2021), https://bit.ly/3wxXHaT [https://
perma.cc/Y4GW-7PL6]. The CDC recommended that employers work with local
health departments to track and trace workplace infections; it did not require such
cooperation. See Case Investigation and Contact Tracing in Non-Healthcare Workplaces, CDC (Oct. 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/3hZoszp [https://perma.cc/2MU8-4Y6N].
153. Grabell et al., supra note 118.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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were at work for all their shifts from April 1 to May 1.157 Even as
late as in September, 2020, meatpacking plants continued to be one
of the main sites of active COVID-19 clusters in Kansas, with
“thousands of cases.”158 And in Michigan, half of all the workplace
deaths that were investigated by the state’s OSHA agency were
linked to COVID-19.159
In light of the early and ongoing clusters of workplace infections, it would have been appropriate for OSHA to develop new
guidance on recordkeeping to allow more effective identification of
workplace infection clusters. Instead, on September 30, 2020,160
OSHA once again limited the reporting requirements for COVID19 infections. On the OSHA COVID-19 FAQ webpage, OSHA limited circumstances under which COVID-19 cases would be reported. In response to the question as to when cases resulting in
hospitalization were reportable to OSHA, OSHA stated, “in order
to be reportable, an in-patient hospitalization due to COVID-19
must occur within 24 hours of an exposure to SARS-CoV-2 at
work.”161 Because of the nature of the infection, it would be nearly
impossible for hospitalization to occur within 24 hours of an infection in the workplace. The normal course of the infection requires
an incubation period, followed by symptoms that increase in severity over time. The CDC has noted a median period of time from the
onset of symptoms to ICU admissions of 9.5 to 12 days, making it
highly unlikely that an employee would be at work 24 hours before
being admitted to the hospital.162 Under this approach, hospitalizations for COVID-19 essentially would not be reported.

157. A Smithfield worker, supra note 131.
158. AP Wire, Kansas Meatpacking Plants Have Highest Number of Active
COVID-19 Cases, FOX4 (Sept. 9, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://bit.ly/3AQx97V [https://
perma.cc/8LPJ-7WAU].
159. Beth LeBlanc, Half of All Workplace Deaths Investigated in Michigan
Linked to COVID-19, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 23, 2020, 1:35 PM), https://bit.ly/
3yBKpLQ [https://perma.cc/4F87-C2WK].
160. The OSHA website does not indicate dates of revision. However, law
firms noticed the change, providing an indication of the timing. See, e.g., Legal
Developments Affecting the Workplace: Updated: OSHA Issues Revised Enforcement Guidance on Reporting COVID-19 Cases, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
(May 20, 2021), https://bit.ly/3xCXmF2 [https://perma.cc/LZN7-9RT3] (noting the
new recordkeeping information was posted on September 30, 2020).
161. OSHA, Non-ETS Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T. OF LAB., https://
bit.ly/3g6aig7 [https://perma.cc/4FT7-R3NU] (last visited Aug. 11, 2021).
162. The CDC website has detailed information on the progression of the disease. See Clinic Care Guidance, CDC (Feb. 16, 2021), https://bit.ly/3r9CBOY
[https://perma.cc/2DM9-NQLK].
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C. OSHA Failed to Enforce Existing Workplace Safety Standards
to Protect Employees from COVID-19
Even though OSHA failed to promulgate an emergency temporary standard that would require employers to take specific actions to protect workers from COVID-19, OSHA could have used
existing requirements and taken rapid enforcement efforts to force
employers to provide safe workplaces. OSHA utterly failed to do
this.
OSHA indicated early on that even though its COVID-19-related guidance documents were not mandatory, employers were
still required by law to provide a workplace “free from recognized
hazards likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”163 This requirement, known as the general duty clause, covers situations in
which there is no specific OSHA safety or health standard. OSHA
noted the applicability of the general duty clause in its March 2020
Guidance, stating that while there were no existing OSHA standards specifically designed for COVID-19 safety in the workplace,
the general duty clause would apply.164 Based on the general duty
clause, OSHA has the authority to inspect most workplaces in the
United States for health and safety violations even in the absence of
a specific OSHA standard.
In June 2020, the National Safety Council (“NSC”) urged
OSHA to create an emergency temporary standard. The NSC reasoned that OSHA needed an emergency temporary standard because the risks of workplace transmission were demonstrable, and
OSHA had not been enforcing the general duty clause as a means
of obtaining employer compliance with guidance documents.165
Relying on the general duty clause, by its nature, imbues workplace safety with the discretion of the inspector. To establish a violation of the general duty clause, OSHA has to establish that:
(1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace
presented a hazard to an employee, (2) either the employer or
the industry recognized the condition or activity as a hazard, (3)
the hazard was likely to or actually caused death or serious physi-

163. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
164. OSHA, supra note 85, at 17.
165. Position/Policy Statement: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Regulatory Authority During the Coronavirus Pandemic, NAT’L
SAFETY COUNCIL (June 2020), https://bit.ly/3wwJ9s2 [https://perma.cc/AN7CWB5Y].
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cal harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard existed.166

The inspector has enormous discretion to determine whether
there is a hazard in a particular workplace, given the layout and
context of that workplace, as well as whether there is a feasible
means to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard in that context.
In addition, it is clear from the agency’s own conduct that
OSHA disfavors using the general duty clause as the basis for enforcing workplace safety. As of early October 2020, the general
duty clause was the basis for only 2 out of the 34 citations that
OSHA issued for COVID-19-related matters.167
OSHA did not use this tool to manage COVID-19 workplace
risks through enforcement action. OSHA could have conducted inspections of workplaces that were showing transmission of COVID19. OSHA could also have investigated employee-complaints of unsafe practices in the workplace. OSHA failed to take either of these
steps. Instead, it issued enforcement guidance that limited on-site
inspection of workplace complaints to health care settings and first
responders.168 All other workplace complaints were to be handled
informally.169 According to a former OSHA policy advisor under
President Obama, such informal investigations are “nothing,” in
which OSHA simply sends “letters to the employer.”170
And, indeed, an investigation by The Washington Post in April
2020 revealed thousands of employee complaints about unsafe
working conditions with little or no response from OSHA. Workers
filed complaints about “shortages of masks and gloves, of being
forced to work with people who appear sick, and of operating in
cramped work areas that prevent them from standing six feet from
one another.”171 As of mid-May 2020, OSHA had received approxi166. SeaWorld of Fla., L.L.C. v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted).
167. See OSHA, Inspections with COVID-related Citations, DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://bit.ly/3dWiluy [https://perma.cc/U3DM-K9SJ] (last visited Aug. 11, 2021)
(listing citations by workplace and including legal basis for citation).
168. Patrick J. Kapust, Memorandum re: Interim Enforcement Response Plan
for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), DEP’T OF LAB.: OSHA (Apr. 13,
2020), https://bit.ly/37vPgmo [https://perma.cc/46CW-9P6U]
169. Id.
170. Rebecca Rainey, Clash over Government Role in Worker Safety Intensifies as Businesses Reopen, POLITICO (May 18, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://politi.co/
2UaR2WI [https://perma.cc/3LDH-A27P] (quoting Debbie Berkowitz).
171. Peter Whoriskey et al., Thousands of OSHA Complaints Filed Against
Companies for Virus Workplace Safety Concerns, Records Show, WASH. POST
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://wapo.st/3yUU3Jq [https://perma.cc/8E8G-XTDH].
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mately 3,990 COVID-19-related complaints.172 OSHA investigated
less than ten percent of these complaints and issued no citations to
employers.173 In fact, one watchdog group reported that OSHA
conducted an average of only 60 investigations per day in early 2020
as compared to 217 per day before the pandemic.174 OSHA’s lack
of responsiveness was evident to workers; the president of the
union that represents poultry workers commented that “People
don’t even waste their time calling OSHA anymore. We’ve called
OSHA and they’re useless.”175
Even in industries which showed signs of becoming the source
of outbreaks in communities, OSHA failed to act. As discussed
above, meatpacking plants quickly became some of the worst clusters of COVID-19 infection in the United States.176 As of August
2020, at least 39,000 workers in meatpacking plants had tested positive, and at least 170 had died.177 It would have been impossible for
OSHA to be unaware of the problems in the meatpacking industry.
As discussed in the previous section, workers at meatpacking plants
reported having contacted OSHA about unsafe practices in their
workplaces. As early as April 2020, the media had flagged
meatpacking plants as being a source of outbreaks in communities.178 Even lawmakers had contacted OSHA about the problems
in meatpacking plants.179 Smithfield itself acknowledged OSHA’s
incredibly slow response to the problems in the meatpacking industry. A company spokesperson stated that Smithfield asked OSHA

172. Rainey, supra note 170.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Whoriskey et al., supra note 171.
176. See Dan Charles, How Widespread Coronavirus Testing Helped
Meatpacking Plants Slow Outbreak, NPR (June 22, 2020, 4:04 PM), https://n.pr/
3s63hR5 [https://perma.cc/Y75L-H86E].
177. Michael Grabell & Bernice Yeung, Meatpacking Companies Dismissed
Years of Warnings but Now Say Nobody Could Have Prepared for COVID-19,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 20, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://bit.ly/3B2Rg2R [https://perma.cc/
AVN6-B45Y]. Despite the fact that meatpacking companies were known outbreak
sites, companies have even denied workers’ compensation benefits to the employees who have died from COVID-19. Tom Hals and Tom Polansek, Meatpackers
Deny Workers Benefits for COVID-19 Deaths, Illnesses, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2020,
1:00 PM), https://reut.rs/3enV7Of [https://perma.cc/FHP7-9CF6].
178. See, e.g., O. Kay Henderson, 67% of Iowa’s 389 COVID Cases Today
Related to Meatpacking Plants, RADIO IOWA (Apr. 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3AGD7Ii [https://perma.cc/MF6X-Z6JG].
179. See id. (noting that three state lawmakers called upon OSHA to investigate a meatpacking plant in Iowa).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK105.txt

222

unknown

Seq: 30

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

15-OCT-21

14:20

[Vol. 126:193

to visit its plants in March and April and that OSHA failed to do
so.180
The situation became sufficiently dire that local and state officials requested assistance from the CDC in early April.181 In late
April, the CDC and OSHA jointly published guidance specifically
for the meat processing industry. This guidance is housed on the
CDC website, but not the OSHA website. Its limited nature is
shown in several ways: (1) it is labeled as “interim” guidance; (2)
unlike most OSHA guidance, it is not located on the OSHA website; and (3) it is, of course, not legally binding.182 The ephemeral
nature of this guidance is evident in its manner of publication.
When OSHA has promulgated guidance during the pandemic, and
then changed it, records of both versions remain readily available
on its website.183 The CDC, however, does not keep different versions of guidance on its website; rather, it revises existing guidance
without maintaining the original.184 The difference may have to do
with the CDC’s lack of enforcement as to employers, unlike at
OSHA, where guidance promulgated by OSHA can be used in such
enforcement actions.185 In other words, by posting the interim guidance on only the CDC’s website, OSHA signaled that it would
likely not be relying upon the guidance in enforcement actions because of the difficulty in proving the terms of the guidance at the
time of the enforcement action—because the CDC regularly up180. Kimberly Kindy, More Than 200 Meat Plant Workers in the U.S. Have
Died Of COVID-19. Federal Regulators Just Issued Two Modest Fines, WASH.
POST, (Sept. 13, 2020), https://wapo.st/3fNIFbb [https://perma.cc/TDQ9-V6ZA].
181. Jonathan W. Dyal, et al., COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities?19 States, April 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 557, 557–61, (2020).
182. For a discussion of the CDC’s lack of authority in regulating the workplace, see Paula E. Berg, When the Hazard Is Human: Irrationality, Inequity, and
Unintended Consequences in Federal Regulation of Contagion, 75 WASH. UNIV. L.
REV. 1367, 1374–75 (1997) (discussing CDC and OSHA authority).
183. See, e.g., OSHA, Enforcement Guidance for Recording Cases of
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), DEP’T OF LAB. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://
bit.ly/3dSTsQK [https://perma.cc/JQ5D-CTXP]; Patrick J. Kapust, Updated Interim Enforcement Response Plan for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
DEP’T OF LAB.: OSHA (May 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/3echnL9 [https://perma.cc/
9W59-A223] (note two different versions of guidance maintained by OSHA on
website).
184. See, e.g., CDC & OSHA, Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers: Interim Guidance from CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Admin. (OSHA), CDC (June 11, 2021), https://bit.ly/2VdUBvv [https://perma.cc/
2T2B-NBKZ].
185. See CDC and OSHA Issue Guidance for Meat and Poultry Processing
Workers and Employers, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/3wpwsyX [https://perma.cc/BLD4-P8E5] (discussing use of OSHA guidance documents
in enforcement actions).
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dates such guidance. And, indeed, defense-side law firms noted that
the guidance is not mandatory and even stated that the guidance
“may not be persuasive” to support an OSHA citation based on the
general duty clause for violating it.186
The meatpacking industry is not the only industry in which
OSHA appears to have abdicated its authority to the CDC.
OSHA’s main COVID-19 webpage contains a link for “Guidance
for Specific Industries.”187 Three industry groups beyond meatpacking have guidance that OSHA notes were “jointly” created with the
CDC.188 All of these interim guidance documents reside on the
CDC website, causing the same enforcement issues that are noted
above.
Despite this, and despite the obviously unsafe practices discussed above, such as a lack of face masks in the workplace and
requiring or encouraging workers to remain at work while sick,
OSHA did not cite a single meatpacking plant for violating the general duty clause until September 10, 2020.189 This is despite the fact
that dozens of meatpacking plants had been closed, at least temporarily, much earlier in 2020.190
To add insult to injury, the amount of the fines in the two instances in which OSHA acted were very small relative to the size of
the companies. OSHA fined Smithfield for unsafe practices at its
Sioux Falls, South Dakota facility. At that facility alone, nearly
1,300 employees became infected with COVID-19, resulting in the
deaths of 4 workers. OSHA levied a fine on Smithfield totaling
$13,494,191 yet Smithfield’s revenue in 2019 was approximately $14
186. Id.
187. OSHA, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), DEP’T OF LAB., https://bit.ly/
3hsqiKp [https://perma.cc/J5PK-CNEM] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
188. OSHA, Control and Prevention, DEP’T OF LAB., https://bit.ly/36nsXi6
[https://perma.cc/LFD6-HWLU] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
189. Ximena Bustillo, U.S. Issues First COVID-19 Fine to Meatpacking Plant
Totaling $13,500, POLITICO, (Sept. 10, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://politi.co/3xzxFV4
[https://perma.cc/AF3D-MS79]; Vin Gurrieri, OSHA’s Wave of Virus Fines Fails to
Win Over Skeptics, LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2020, 5:36 PM), https://bit.ly/3AFSdOv
[https://perma.cc/39FA-PXTH] (discussing citations); Alex Gangitano, Colorado
Meatpacking Union Protests ‘Ineffectual’ Federal Fine Amid Coronavirus, THE
HILL (Sept. 16, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://bit.ly/3hEnARW [https://perma.cc/J2X6Q9Q5] (discussing the second company fined).
190. There were so many closures that the Meat & Poultry website began a
listing of closures along with an interactive map of them in June, 2020. See Map:
COVID-19 Meat Plant Closures, MEAT + POULTRY (June 23, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3hrHeR1 [https://perma.cc/9XQX-GBY3]. Closures began as early as the first
week in April. Id.
191. Gurrieri, supra note 189.
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billion.192 On September 11, 2020, OSHA fined JBS $15,615 for an
unsafe workplace in Greeley, Colorado, yet JBS’s revenue in 2019
was over $51 billion.193 At the Greeley plant, 290 workers tested
positive for COVID-19 and 6 died.194 Experts have criticized
OSHA for the relatively small fine amounts, with one epidemiologist calling the fines “miniscule,”195 and the union representing the
workers in Colorado stating that the fine was “ineffectual.”196
Not only has OSHA failed to effectively enforce existing standards as to substantive health and safety violations, OSHA has also
failed to investigate and enforce existing standards as to
whistleblowers who reported violations of these standards and
faced retaliation. The Inspector General for the Department of Labor investigated OSHA’s handling of these COVID-19
whistleblower complaints and issued a report titled “COVID-19:
OSHA Needs to Improve its Handling of Whistleblower Complaints During the Pandemic.”197 The report noted that there had
been an increase in whistleblower complaints due to the pandemic
and found that OSHA’s inspectors were prioritizing the screening
of cases, which allowed cases to be closed and removed from
OSHA’s purview, over investigating them.198
Another aspect of OSHA’s failure to enforce standards is exemplified by OSHA’s failure to use programmed inspections as a
way to send a message to all employers that they need to take steps
to reduce transmission of the virus. As discussed above, programmed inspections reduce injury rates. OSHA could have leveraged
this power by announcing an inspection program focusing on transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in the workplace—not just inspections of
workplaces where OSHA had received complaints. OSHA issued
an Interim Enforcement Response Plan, but that plan focused on
prioritizing inspections of workplaces OSHA identified as having a
high risk of exposure where there had been complaints of infection
risk.199 As noted above, this was focused on hospitals, emergency
care centers, and emergency response facilities.200 Neither the In192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Kindy, supra note 180.
Id.
Id.
Gurrieri, supra note 189.
Gangitano, supra note 189.
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., COVID-19: OSHA
NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS HANDLING OF WHISTLEBLOWER COMPLAINTS DURING
THE PANDEMIC 2 (2020).
198. Id. at 8.
199. See KAPUST, supra note 168.
200. Id.
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terim Enforcement Response Plan nor the Updated Interim Enforcement Response Plan for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19)201 included a plan for conducting programmed inspections focusing on the risk of SARS-CoV-2.202 The failure to create an inspection program for workplaces might have made sense in the
early months of the pandemic. However, even in late 2020, OSHA
had not released a plan to change its programmed inspection
priorities.
In contrast to OSHA, some state OSHA agencies have taken a
more proactive approach to policing workplaces for COVID-19-related safety and health infractions. In Nevada, the state agency
cited 187 workplaces between March and November 2020 and conducted 2,197 follow-up visits.203 During a similar time period, from
the start of the pandemic until the end of October 2020, OSHA,
responsible for nearly half the workplaces in the United States,
cited only 112 workplaces for violations relating to COVID-19.204
Furthermore, the aggressive enforcement actions in Nevada appear
to have been effective: during follow-up visits conducted by regulators, approximately 96 percent of employers were in compliance.205
Nevada was also proactive in focusing its enforcement efforts where
they were most necessary by targeting locations which met CDC
indicators of elevated transmission rates for COVID-19.206
III.

IMPROVING OSHA’S PANDEMIC RESPONSE: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM STATE RESPONSES AND PLANNING
FOR THE FUTURE

OSHA could have implemented a host of actions at a national
level to protect all American workers. Section II critiqued OSHA’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and implicit in that analysis
were proposals for what OSHA could have done better. Part A of
this Section explicitly identifies the core components of an improved response. In the remainder of this Section, I propose struc201. See Patrick J. Kapust, Updated Interim Enforcement Response Plan for
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), OSHA (May 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/
3yGZWK6 [https://perma.cc/9XSU-YZGE].
202. Id.
203. Matt Vaughan, Nevada Businesses Cited for COVID Violations, ABC 8
(Nov. 23, 2020, 10:27 PM), https://bit.ly/3qZLrP6 [https://perma.cc/E739-9JX5].
204. OSHA, OSHA News Release, U.S. Department of Labor’s OSHA Announces $1,603,544 In Coronavirus Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://bit.ly/3xvwjvr [https://perma.cc/2EXZ-VZ3L].
205. Vaughan, supra note 203.
206. NEV. DEP’T OF BUS. & INDUS., DIV. OF INDUS. RELS., UPDATED NEVADA OSHA ENFORCEMENT PROCESS DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC (Nov. 2,
2020), https://bit.ly/3qXHgU2 [https://perma.cc/6L54-58B9].
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tural changes to the OSH Act and OSHA to improve the safety and
health of workers in the event of another pandemic.
A. Under the Current OSH Act, Managing a Pandemic Response
As discussed in Section II, the circumstances of the COVID-19
pandemic certainly make for a situation in which an emergency
temporary standard should at least be considered. While emergency
temporary standards have not been used for decades, a pandemic
certainly calls for their use. As long as the pandemic poses a significant risk of death or serious bodily injury, the “grave danger” requirement for an emergency temporary standard will be met.
OSHA should thus focus primarily on creating a factual record for
the workplace safety measures that would be “necessary” to stem
the rate of infections occurring in the workplace. Recognizing the
potential need for an emergency temporary standard, one of the
first actions President Biden undertook after his inauguration was a
directive to OSHA to “consider whether any emergency temporary
standards on COVID-19, including with respect to masks in the
workplace, are necessary,” and to issue any such standards by
March 15, 2021.207
In terms of the content of an emergency temporary standard,
while it may not have been obvious in January what measures were
necessary to prevent infections, it was certainly clear by March or
April that masks were a critical component. A very basic emergency temporary standard could have required employers to provide face masks and required workers to wear them when working
at an employer’s workplace instead of at home. Employers currently subject to existing standards that were more stringent would
be required to adhere to those. For most employers outside of the
medical field, required masks would have been made of disposable
paper instead of N95 personal protective gear. Employers who were
unable to obtain face masks, due to initial shortages, could have
been exempted, or could have been provided with governmental
assistance to locate and obtain masks.
Imposing a basic mask mandate would have had benefits beyond the obvious reduction in infection rates and potential severity
of infections. During mask shortage periods, which is likely to be
when infection rates spike and the demand/cost for masks is at its
highest, it could have induced some employers to keep workers at
home. This would have had the potential to reduce infections during critical periods. In addition, a mask mandate would have had
207. Executive Order 13999, 86 Fed. Reg. 7211 (Jan. 26, 2021).
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the potential to reduce mask-wearing animus by normalizing maskwearing behavior.
Beyond requiring masks, an effective emergency temporary
standard in a pandemic needs to require workplace reporting of infections. Throughout the pandemic, OSHA has minimized reporting requirements. This lack of reported information enhances risks
to workers and increases the likelihood of outbreaks. The California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“CALOSHA”) provides a blueprint for reporting requirements for
COVID-19 exposures in the workplace that OSHA could use. In
September 2020, California created new reporting requirements for
COVID-19 and gave CAL-OSHA power to close down parts of
workplaces with a “risk of infection” “so as to constitute an imminent hazard.”208 The new law notes that existing law was unclear on
employer reporting requirements in the COVID-19 pandemic and
that tracing and tracking cases is one of the “best tools” for “limiting exposure and minimizing spread” of the disease.209 The law requires that employers provide notice to all employees of any
potential exposure to the coronavirus in the workplace, in writing,
within one business day of being notified of the exposure.210 The
written notice must also include information on any COVID-19 related benefits they may have, such as the right to leave, and the
employer’s sanitation and safety plans.211 Furthermore, the employer must provide notice to the local public health agency if the
number of cases constitutes an outbreak, as defined by the state
Department of Health.212 In order to ensure employees would in
fact report infections, the law prohibits employers from retaliating
against any employee who reports a positive test, positive diagnosis,
or order to isolate or quarantine.213
An emergency temporary standard focusing on the most critical aspect of preventing workplace transmission in a pandemic
would be ideal because it would be mandatory. However, interim
guidance documents serve to reduce risks of infection while emergency temporary standards are being drafted. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the risks of infection posed by future
viruses, it may not be feasible for an emergency temporary standard
to cover all the behavior that should be undertaken by employers
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Assemb. B. 685, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
Id. § 1.
Id. § 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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because of difficulties in proving that all advisable behavior is “necessary.” Thus, an emergency temporary standard could be supplemented by guidance documents.
These guidance documents should address additional ways to
protect workers by reducing workplace transmissions of the relevant disease. For example, information about risks posed by different workplaces could be included in a guidance document, while
the most critical features to prevent or reduce infection would be
contained in the emergency temporary standard. Because guidance
documents are non-binding, they would not be subject to court
challenges, which allows OSHA greater latitude in promulgating
them. These guidance documents should more clearly identify the
most critical aspects of stemming workplace infections and steps
employers should take to reduce them. As discussed above, current
OSHA guidance is unclear, making it difficult for employers to discern the precise steps they should be taking.
Looking beyond guidance documents, OSHA needs to be prepared to shift its enforcement activities in the event of a pandemic.
First, OSHA needs to identify the types of workplaces most at risk
of outbreaks in a pandemic. These types of workplaces should be a
priority for programmed inspections. Second, OSHA should triage
and prioritize its reactive inspections based on employee complaints. OSHA’s utter failure with respect to meat-processing facilities illustrates the outcome of failing to take either of the above
steps in a pandemic. And while OSHA may have chosen the route
of not undertaking in-person inspections due to concerns for its personnel, by doing so OSHA entirely abdicated its responsibility to
workers. Just as doctors and nurses still worked to help patients
despite risks of contracting COVID-19, OSHA inspectors need to
work in person to protect American workers.
These steps provide a template for how OSHA should manage
the next pandemic under current law. However, there are structural
issues that hamstring OSHA’s ability to be as effective as it could
be. These issues mostly require legislative action, such as amendments to the OSH Act, and are discussed below.
B. Revise OSH Act Requirements for Emergency Temporary
Standards
Even if the leadership of OSHA under President Trump
wanted to promulgate an emergency temporary standard, the
problems with drafting an enforceable standard, discussed in Section I, create a significant disincentive for OSHA to take this approach. Thus, even under an administration which was more
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proactive in protecting workers, promulgating a viable standard
that would survive a court challenge would be challenging.
There are several ways to amend the OSH Act to allow OSHA
to create a more effective emergency temporary standard. As it is
currently written, the OSH Act requires that there be a “grave danger” to workers and that an emergency temporary standard be
“necessary” to reduce the danger.214 The word “necessary” is defined as “absolutely needed: required” and “essential.”215 The nature of an emergency situation is such that it is unlikely that this
type of evidence will be available.
An incremental change would be to replace the word “necessary” with the phrase “reasonably likely to be effective in reducing
the risk.” This would place the emphasis of analysis on whether
there is a grave danger to workers. It would also make it easier for
an emergency temporary standard to be upheld as valid by the
courts.216 Establishing that a standard is “necessary” is a high hurdle. Indeed, it is sufficiently difficult to meet the requirements for
an emergency temporary standard that OSHA has failed to promulgate any since 1983.217 Prior to that, OSHA attempted to promulgate emergency temporary standards on a number of occasions, but
most of the standards were challenged in court and many were vacated or otherwise blocked from becoming effective.218 While
courts varied in their reasons for blocking the standards,219 a common focus was on the language that the standard be “necessary,”
with courts determining that this requirement was not fulfilled.220
214. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c).
215. Necessary, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://bit.ly/2UExnOJ
[https://perma.cc/MGY4-8UGE] (last visited Aug. 11, 2021).
216. The problems of establishing the requirements for an emergency temporary standard have been recognized for some time. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 182
at 1405 n.225 (noting that “it is unlikely that OSHA could ever meet the high
standard for issuing an emergency temporary standard for workplace contagion”);
Junius C. McElveen, Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 CIN. L.
REV. 1553, 1564 (1995) (noting possible high standard on scientific evidence required for issuing an emergency temporary standard).
217. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 45, at 22.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Lab., 486 F.2d 98, 106, 108
(3d Cir. 1973) (finding that OSHA’s “conclusory statement of reasons [for the
standard] places too great a burden on interested persons to determine and challenge the basis for the standard” and vacating the emergency temporary standard
in part).
220. See, e.g., Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U. S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120,
129 (5th Cir. 1974) (“We find no substantial evidence in the record considered as a
whole to support the determination by the Secretary that emergency temporary
standards were necessary.”); Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N. Am. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Admin., 727 F.2d 415, 426 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The Agency has not proved
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OSHA needs the latitude to impose short-term requirements that
are reasonably likely to reduce the risk of infection to workers
based on the evidence available when there is a “grave danger” to
workers.
A second step221 that should be taken is loosening or eliminating the requirements for the OSHA permanent standard that will
supplant the emergency temporary standard. In order to promulgate an emergency temporary standard, OSHA must immediately
undertake the rulemaking process for a permanent standard, which
must be created within six months.222 As is evident from the progression of the pandemic, six months is simply insufficient time for
an agency to know what the final rule should be. The scientific information may not be sufficiently established for a rule to be created. Furthermore, vaccines can halt a pandemic, obviating the
need for a permanent standard.
There are two ways of dealing with this problem. First, the
OSH Act should be amended to specifically allow OSHA to revise
the emergency temporary standard in light of new information.223
Second, OSHA should have a longer period of time to promulgate
the permanent standard, such as a year, given that OSHA’s normal
rulemaking process can take years. The Congressional Research
Service assessed OSHA’s normal rulemaking process and found
that the estimated duration of the rulemaking process is between 52
and 138 months, which is at least 4 years.224 Outside of this process,
the initial steps of preliminary rulemaking activity and developing
that the ETS, OSHA’s most dramatic weapon in its enforcement arsenal, is ‘necessary’ to achieve the projected benefits.”).
221. Changing the “grave danger” portion of the standard is a potential approach as well but does not seem necessary to address pandemics. To be a grave
danger, the danger must be a “danger of incurable, permanent, or fatal consequences to workers, as opposed to easily curable and fleeting effects on their
health.” Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 132. This standard would be met in
the current pandemic given the deadly and long-term consequences of COVID-19.
And lowering this portion of the standard would be at odds with the extraordinary
nature of the emergency temporary standard, under which there is no notice and
comment period available before the standard becomes effective. The standard is
properly limited to situations involving a “grave danger,” and the problems of
proving that are more effectively addressed by revising the “necessary” portion of
the standard.
222. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c).
223. At least one court has indicated that OSHA has the authority to do this
already; however, it would be better to codify this since the issue has not been
determined by the Supreme Court. See Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 127
(holding that “emergency temporary standards may be amended in the same manner and under the same criteria as govern their initial issuance”).
224. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 45, at 4.
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the text of the rule take between 24 and 72 months combined.225
Forcing OSHA to undertake in one year what would normally require between two and six years is virtually impossible. Requiring
OSHA to do so in an emergency, such as a pandemic, when the
agency needs to be focused on investigating complaints, inspecting
workplaces, and assisting employers in their compliance efforts, is
completely unrealistic and emphasizes the wrong priorities.
Finally, OSHA should be given the authority to issue emergency temporary standards for a limited period of time without
promulgating a final rule on the issue. If, as appears to be the case
with COVID-19, a vaccine becomes readily available, there will no
longer be any need for masks and social distancing in the workplace. Requiring OSHA to promulgate a final rule that would be
rescinded as soon as a vaccine becomes available is a complete
waste of time and resources. A more flexible approach would be to
revise the OSH Act to create the option for OSHA to establish an
initial emergency temporary standard for six months, with the capacity to extend the duration of the standard two or three times.
C. Increase Budget for OSHA Inspectors
A perpetual issue for OSHA is an insufficient number of inspectors. As discussed in Section I.C., the number of OSHA inspectors has remained essentially the same, while the number of
workplaces it oversees has grown. This imbalance needs to be corrected. The value of OSHA inspections, to individual workers
whose workplaces will be safer, as well as overall to the economy as
employers achieve cost reductions due to fewer injuries, should be
leveraged by increasing the funding at OSHA for inspectors. The
most effective way to ensure that OSHA has ample inspectors is to
legislatively tie funding for inspector positions to the number of
workers for whom OSHA is responsible. This would reduce the
politicization of OSHA’s annual budget justifications and help ensure an adequate number of inspectors.
D. Limited Private Right of Action for Employees
Congress should also pass legislation to give employees a private right of action in limited circumstances. Employees who complain about OSHA violations and are retaliated against by their
employers should be afforded the right to sue in federal court. Numerous federal statutes contain this whistleblower-type of remedy.
Probably the best-known example of this is the Sarbanes-Oxley
225. Id.
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Act, under which employees who disclose securities fraud committed by companies are protected from retaliation.226 Federal law now
protects whistleblowers who complain about violations of a variety
of federal laws, including areas such as consumer products safety,227
employment discrimination,228 and public transportation safety.229
At the present time, employees who complain to OSHA about
their employers’ OSHA violations can file a complaint with OSHA
if they are retaliated against.230 However, these employees have
only the right to an administrative hearing; they have no right to
bring suit if OSHA fails to act for years or OSHA decides the claim
in favor of the employer. There are dozens of federal statutes that
protect whistleblowers with the right to sue in federal court, making
it anomalous that employees who disclose violations of federal
safety and health laws are left with only a limited administrative
remedy. This is especially true given OSHA’s lack of enforcement
resources discussed above. OSHA cannot effectively investigate the
complaints it receives regarding safety and health violations, much
less the complaints regarding retaliation by those employees. Furthermore, there is evidence that employees will complain less frequently during a recession due to concerns about losing their job
and the difficulty of finding a new one in a recession.231 Creating a
federal claim would help encourage these employees to disclose
OSHA violations in the workplace without fear of retaliation.
This claim would be a very limited claim. It would not allow all
employees who file OSHA violation complaints to sue in federal
court. Creating that type of broad claim would be problematic because of the potential conflict with different areas of the law, particularly workers’ compensation laws.232
226. For a discussion of the development of this law, see NANCY M.
MODESITT ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ch.
1.III. (3d ed. 2015).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2087.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
229. 6 U.S.C. § 1142.
230. 29 U.S.C. § 660.
231. Maintaining Effective U.S. Labor Standards Enforcement Through the
Coronavirus Recession, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://bit.ly/2TVeMOz [https://perma.cc/JD4J-SSPQ].
232. Assuming that an employee has been injured because the employer
failed to correct the safety violation, that employee already has a workers’ compensation claim in most instances. Giving an OSHA claim on top of that would
interfere with the underlying bargain made in the workers’ compensation context,
which is that the employee gives up the right to sue in court for the injury in exchange for a near-guarantee of compensation and coverage for health care costs.
And, if the employee does not get injured because of the safety violation, then
there is no harm to serve as a basis for the claim in federal court.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-1\DIK105.txt

unknown

2021] OSHA’S COMPREHENSIVE FAILURE

Seq: 41

TO

15-OCT-21

PROTECT WORKERS

14:20

233

CONCLUSION
OSHA has utterly failed to protect workers during the
COVID-19 pandemic by failing to promulgate an emergency temporary standard, developing guidance that is unclear and ineffective, and failing to proactively and reactively investigate
workplaces. Researchers warn that it is only a matter of time until
the next pandemic. OSHA’s current guidance documents provide
an example of what should not be done in such a situation, and this
Article outlined how to change OSHA’s approach. In addition, legislative action needs to be taken now to provide OSHA with the
ability to promulgate emergency temporary standards with less risk
of them being blocked in the courts and to ensure sufficient funding
for OSHA’s enforcement branch in the future.
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